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INDIAN COUNTRY: THE DEPENDENT INDIAN
COMMUNITY CONCEPT AND TRIBAL/TRIBAL MEMBER
IMMUNITY FROM STATE TAXATION
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment analyzes various judicial tests for determining whether a
"dependent Indian community" exists under the federal Indian country statute, 18
U.S.C. section 1151 (1994); suggests an alternative test; and considers the
implications of each test for tribal and tribal member immunity from state
taxation. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the question
of state authority to tax Indian tribes and tribal members. In several decisions,
the Court has articulated the principle that tribal and tribal member immunity
from state taxation is limited by the geographic boundaries of a tribe's territory.'
For example, in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,2 the Court held
that a state may not tax an Indian living on a reservation for income earned
exclusively on the reservation, unless Congress authorizes such taxation.
Since McClanahan, the Supreme Court has extended the presumption against
state taxation beyond reservation boundaries to Indian country. In Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation,4 the Court held that a state could not tax
tribal members who live and work within Indian country, absent congressional
authorization. Further, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,5 the
Court held that unless Congress grants the authority to a state, a state cannot tax
a tribe or tribal members' income earned from the tribe within Indian country, if
the legal incidence 6 of the tax falls on the tribe or its members. However, the
Court also determined that a state can tax the income of tribal members who work
for their tribe, but reside outside of Indian country. 7
The Supreme Court's decisions in Sac and Fox and Chickasaw Nation
established that the designation of Indian country is important for establishing

1. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
2. 411 U.S. at 171.
3. See Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2217; Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 124.
4. 508 U.S. at 127. The Oklahoma Tax Commission argued that the McClanahan presumption against
taxation did not extend beyond the boundaries of a formal reservation to land set aside for a tribe or its
members. See id. at 123. The Sac and Fox Court rejected this argument, stating "we have never drawn the
distinction Oklahoma urge[s]." Id. at 125.
5. 115 S. Ct. at 2214, 2217. The Chickasaw Nation Court, however, stated that if the legal incidence of
a state tax falls on non-Indians, "no categorical bar prevents enforcement of the tax; if the balance of federal,
State, and tribal interests favors the State, and federal law is not to the contrary, the State may impose its levy."
I at 2220. Also, a state is free to amend its tax laws to shift the legal incidence of its tax if the state is unable
to enforce its tax as currently designed. See id. at 2221.
6. The phrase "legal incidence" of a tax refers to the person upon whom the taxing statute says the tax
falls. See Chickasaw Nation, 115S. Ct. at 2216. For example, if a tax statute says "a tax is imposed on the
purchaser," the legal incidence of the tax falls on the purchaser, not the seller.
7. See id. The Chickasaw Nation Court based its holding on interstate and international tax principles.
See id. at 2222. The Court stated that it is universally recognized that a taxing sovereign can tax the receipt of
income by a resident of its territory because "[d]omicile itself affords a basis for such taxation." Id. (quoting
New York ex reL Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1937)).
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8
tribal and tribal member immunity from state taxation Congress has defined
Indian country broadly in 18 U.S.C. section 1151 as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States... ; (b) all dependent Indian communities within the

borders of the United States ... ; (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles
to which have not been extinguished . .. .9

In most cases, it is clear whether a parcel of land included within a specific
class of land is Indian country.' 0 In particular, Indian allotments, which consist
of "land owned by individual Indians and either held in trust by the United States
or subject to a statutory restriction on alienation," are easily recognized as Indian12
exists.
country."1 Also, it is generally clear whether an Indian reservation
an
Originally, "[t]he term 'Indian reservation' ... meant any land reserved from
3 By
tenure.'"
of
form
the
of
regardless
government
Indian cession to the federal
the 1850s, however, "the modern meaning of Indian reservation emerged,
referring to land set aside under federal protection for the residence of tribal
Indians, regardless of origin."' 4 Pursuant to this modem definition, the United
in
States Supreme Court has held that fee land purchased by a tribe and placed
5 In
reservation."
Indian
an
constitutes
Interior
the
of
Secretary
the
by
trust
contrast, because the dependent Indian community concept is not statutorily
whether an area of
defined and is ill-defined by case law, it is usually unclear
6
land may be considered a dependent Indian community.'
The degree of clarity of the dependent Indian community concept depends upon
the form of analysis courts adopt to determine whether a dependent Indian
community exists. If a formalistic analysis linked directly to the status of the
relevant land is adopted, the parameters of the dependent Indian community
concept will be clear; but, the concept may also be of limited significance because
it will largely parallel the reservation concept.' In contrast, if a flexible analysis
is adopted, specific determinations will be more problematic, but the concept will
be more viable.
Part II of this Comment provides a historical overview of the development of
the Indian country statute. Part III discusses four judicial tests for determining18
v. Martine,
whether a dependent Indian community exists: United States

8. See Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. at 2217; Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 124. While tribal members
domiciled within -Indian country are immune from state taxation of income earned from their tribe, tribal
members domiciled outside of Indian country could be subject to state tax burdens. See Chickasaw Nation, 115
S. Ct. at 2217; Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at 124.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
10. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 28 (1982 ed.).
11. Id. at 40.
12. See id at 28.
13. Id at34.
14. Id.
15. See id at 39; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511
(1991) (holding that trust land qualifies as a reservation for tribal immunity from state taxation).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
17. See infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text.
18. 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971).
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United States v. South Dakota,'9 NarragansettIndian Tribe of Rhode Island v.
NarragansettElectric Co.,20 and Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government.2 Narragansettand Venetie are
modifications of the South Dakota dependent Indian community test. Part IV
analyzes the tests discussed in Part III, focusing on the requirement established
in Narragansettand Venetie that the federal government "set apart" the land in
question. 2 Part V suggests an alternative, functional analysis for determining
whether a dependent Indian community exists. This analysis considers: (1) the
proper community of reference; (2) whether an Indian community exists within
the community of reference; and, assuming an Indian community exists, (3)
whether the relationshipbetween the federal government and the Indian
community, as a whole, evidences that the community is dependent on the federal
government, regardless of the status of the land on which the Indian community
lives. Finally, Part VI discusses the implications of the different dependent Indian
community analyses for tribal and tribal member immunity from state taxation.
II. HISTORY
The phrase "Indian country" has a long and complex history.23 During the
American colonial period, the British government used the term "country" to
describe separate territory occupied by Indian tribes.24 Following the American
Revolution, Congress used the phrase "Indian country" in several early Trade and
Intercourse Acts to describe Indian lands. 25 Although Congress referred to
"Indian country" in these early acts, it did not define the phrase until the 1834
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act (1834 Act). The 1834 Act defined Indian
country as:
[A]II that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within the
states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the Territory of Arkansas, and, also that
part of the United States east of the Mississippi river, and not within any State
to which the Indian title has not been extinguished .... 26
This definition of Indian country evidenced the federal government's policy of
removing Indian tribes to areas west of the Mississippi to lands "set apart" from
the rest of the United States.27 The federal government gradually departed from
its removal policy in favor of reservation and allotment policies in the early

19. 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981).
20. 89 F.3d 908 (lst Cir. 1996).
21. 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), overruling 1995 WL 462232 (D. Alaska 1995). cert. granted, 117 S.
CL 2478 (1997).
22. The terms "set aside" and "set apart" are used interchangeably in this Comment.
23. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 27-39.
24. See id. at 29.
25. See id. "The term 'Indian country' appeared in the temporary Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790 to
1799, in the first permanent Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802, and in the Trading House laws of 1796-1822."
lit (footnotes omitted).
26. It at 30. (citing the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834 (1834 Act), ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729
(1834)). "The 1834 Act included numerous substantive laws governing trade, non-Indian trespass, crimes, liquor
traffic, and other activities taking place in the Indian country." Id. at 31.
27. See id.
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1850s. 28 This policy shift made the 1834 Act's definition of Indian country
obsolete; however, the statutory definition of Indian country remained in force
until the compilers of the Revised Statutes omitted it in 1874.29
Without a statutory definition of Indian country, courts after 1874 were left to
3
themselves to determine what constituted Indian country. 3 In Bates v. Clark, '
the Supreme Court examined a case that arose before the 1874 repeal of the 1834
definition of Indian country. Bates involved the seizure of liquor by military
3 3 Under the wording of
officers on ceded land32 within the Dakota Territory.
the 1834 definition, it was arguable that all of the Dakota Territory remained
3
Indian country despite Indian land cessions. ' The Court, however, rejected that
interpretation of the 1834 definition and held the seizure was unlawful because
35 The Court held that
the ceded lands implicitly ceased to be Indian country.
Indian lands remained Indian country so long as the Indians retained their original
title. 36 However, the Court indicated that as soon as the Indians parted with
their original title, the land ceased to be Indian country, absent an applicable
treaty provision or an act of Congress.3 7
The Court's decision in Bates raised questions about whether Indian country
included reservations or individual allotments, which were not held in aboriginal
title. 38 After Bates, the Supreme Court decided several cases which "resolved
the questions raised by Bates .... and clarified the definition of Indian country
. , . In Donnelly v. United States,40 the Supreme Court held that a
reservation was Indian country. The Court reasoned that "nothing can more
appropriately be deemed 'Indian country,'. . . than a tract of land that, being a
part of the public domain, is lawfully set apart as an Indian reservation.'
A year later, in United States v. Pelican,42 the Supreme Court again extended
the definition of Indian country, holding that a single trust allotment was Indian
country. The Court stated that the trust allotments 43 were Indian country

28.
29.
30.
31.

See id
See id
See id
95 U.S. 204 (1877); see also COHEN, supra note 10, at 31.

32. "Ceded land" is land surrendered by an Indian tribe to the federal government pursuant to a treaty. See,
e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 116 (1993) (describing process of ceding
land).

33. See Bates, 95 U.S. at 204.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 207.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 31.
39. Id at 32; see United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442
(1914); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
40. 228 U.S. at 269. Donnelly involved a criminal prosecution for the murder of an Indian "by one who
[was] not of Indian blood" within the limits of an Indian reservation. See id. at 252, 269-72.
41.

Id at 269.

42. 232 U.S. at 449. Pelican involved a criminal prosecution for the murder of an Indian by presumed nonIndians on an individual Indian allotment. See id. at 444, 451.
43. "Trust allotments" are lands owned by individual Indians that are held in trust by the federal
government. See id. at 446.
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because they were "validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the
superintendence of the government.""
In the same year as its decision in Donnelly, the Supreme Court clarified the
definition of Indian country in United States v. Sandoval,4 5 by creating the
dependent Indian community concept. In Sandoval, the Court held that Congress
had the authority to prohibit the introduction of liquor into the Pueblos of New
Mexico. 46 In reaching its decision, the Court discussed the source of federal
power over tribes, and stated:
Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate
commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued legislative and executive
usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the
United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of
exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders .. .

After discussing the source of broad federal power over "all dependent Indian
communities," the Sandoval Court analyzed the relationship between the
legislative and executive branches and the Pueblos.48 The Court recognized that
"by an [sic] uniform [and continuous] course of action beginning as early as
1854," the legislative and executive branches had treated the Pueblos as
dependent communities "requiring special consideration and protection, like other
Indian communities." 49
Additionally, the Sandoval Court addressed the argument that the federal
legislation in question "cannot be made to include the lands of the Pueblos,
because the Indians have a fee simple title." 50 The Court expressly rejected this
argument, and stated:
It is true that the Indians of each [Plueblo do have... [fee simple] title to all
the lands connected therewith, excepting such as are occupied under Executive
[Oirders, but it is a communal title, no individual owning any separate tract.
In other words, the lands are public lands of the [P]ueblo, and so the situation
is essentially the same as it was with the Five Civilized Tribes, whose lands,
although owned in fee under patents from the United States, were adjudged
subject to the legislation of Congress enacted in the exercise of the
government's guardianship over those tribes and their affairs.5

44. i at 449 (citing Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 271, 272).
45. 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913). Sandoval involved a criminal prosecution for introducing liquor into the
Santa Clara Pueblo of New Mexico. See id. at 36.
46. See id at 49.
47. Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
48. See id. at 47.
49. Id at 39. The Court recognized that the United States provided substantial assistance to the Pueblos
including: (1) federal funding; (2) agents and superintendents; (3) central training and day schools; (4) economic
development; (5) legal counsel; and (6) immunity from certain territorial taxes. See id. at 39-40.
50. Id. at 48.
51. Id.
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The Court concluded that those Indian communities that the legislative and
executive branches had treated, in effect, as dependent Indian communities should
52
be treated by the courts as dependent Indian communities.
53 the Supreme Court further
Finally, in 1938 in United States v. McGowan,
discussed the dependent Indian community concept developed in Sandoval. In
McGowan, the Court held that the Reno Indian Colony, located on a tract of land
that the United States purchased and held in trust for the Colony, was a dependent
Indian community.' In reaching this decision, the Court reasoned that the Reno
Colony was a dependent Indian community because:
The Reno Colony has been validly set apart for the use of the Indians.
It is under the superintendence of the Government. The Government retains
title to the lands which it permits the Indians to occupy. The Government has
authority to enact regulations and protective laws respecting this territory."
The Court further stated that the facts of the case, viewed in light of the long
relationship between the Reno Colony and the United States, indicated that the
Colony was Indian country. 6
Following the Court's decision in McGowan, the scope of Indian country
country
remained unclear." For example, it was not clear whether 5Indian
8
included fee patented land located within an Indian reservation. However, in
1948, in an effort to "consolidate[] numerous conflicting and inconsistent
provisions of law .

. .,"

Congress enacted a statutory definition of Indian

country.59 Congress based its 1948 definition of Indian country on the "latest
construction of the term by the United States Supreme Court" in Donnelly,
Pelican, Sandoval, and McGowan.60
Although Congress defined "Indian country" by listing three distinct categories61
component.
of land, it failed to further define the dependent Indian community
Congress
that
indicates
Act
The Revisor's Note for section 1151 of the 1948
construction
the
codified the phrase "dependent Indian community" based upon
on Sandoval.62
of the phrase by the Supreme Court in McGowan, which relied
1151(b), Congress codified the exact language used by
In fact, in drafting section
63
the Court in Sandoval.

52. See id. at 47.
53. 302 U.S. 535 (1938). McGowan involved a criminal prosecution for introducing intoxicants into Indian
country. See id at 536.
54. See ide at 538-39.
55. Id at 539 (citing Hallowell v. United States, 221 U.S. 317 (1911)).
56. See ide

57. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Historical and Revision Notes, 1948 Act (1994).
58. See generally COHEN, supra note 10, at 37.

59. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Historical and Revision Notes, 1948 Act (1994).
60. See id. Subsection (a) of section 1151 is a codification of Donnelly; subsection (b) is a codification of
Sandoval and McGowan; and subsection (c) is a codification of Pelican.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Historical and Revision Notes, 1948 Act (1994).
63. Compare id with United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
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Although the phrase "dependent Indian community" was codified by Congress
in 1948, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the phrase since codification.'
However, several lower federal and state courts have done so. Both federal and
state courts have followed two primary tests for determining whether a dependent
Indian community exists: (1) the United States v. Martine65 test; and (2) the
United States v. South Dakota6 test. 67 Additionally, in two recent decisions,
federal circuit courts have applied modified versions of the South Dakota
analysis.6
III. ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIAL TESTS FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER A DEPENDENT INDIAN COMMUNITY EXISTS
This section evaluates the four primary judicial tests for determining whether
an area can be classified as a dependent Indian community. Analysis of each test
demonstrates that federal and state courts are uncertain as to the parameters of the
dependent Indian community concept. In the past, courts have applied both
flexible and formalistic tests to determine whether an area was a dependent Indian
community. 69 In recent decisions, however, courts have moved towards a more
formalistic analysis tied directly to the status of the land in question.70
Specifically, courts require that the federal government either own or have "set
apart" the land in question before a dependent Indian community can exist.7
As a result, the dependent Indian community concept may be of limited
significance because it largely parallels the reservation concept.72 This section
evaluates the soundness of the "set apart" requirement as applied to the dependent
Indian community concept and suggests that a dependent Indian community may
64. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 856 F.2d 1384,
1391 (9th Cir. 1988).
65. 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971).
66. 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981).
67. See, e.g., Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908 (1st Cir. 1996); Housing
Auth. of the Seminole Nation v. Harjo, 790 P.2d 1098 (Okla. 1990).
Additionally, state courts in the East have developed an alternative test for determining whether a dependent
Indian community exists. Under this test,
a dependent Indian community exists if: (1) there is a bona fide tribe of Indians, and (2) the
tribe has inhabited the land, has had "Indian title" to itsince 1790, and has maintained the
same status and nature of its occupancy from 1790 to the time the cause of action arose.
Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1545 n.15 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Maine
v. Dana, 404 A.2d 551, 562 (Me. 1979) (holding that in regard to federal criminal jurisdiction, Indian country
would include land occupied by the Passamaquoddy Tribe if the elements of the alternative test were met)).
"Several state courts in the East have adopted [this] alternative test because of the historical differences in the
relationship of the federal and state governments to Indians in the [e]astern and [wlestern United States
throughout this nation's history." Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1545 n.15. This Comment, however, will not explicitly
address this alternative test, because it is limited to specific tribes and geographical areas.
68. See Alaska ex. rel.
Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the territory held in fee simple by two native villages of Alaska was a dependent
Indian community), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 2478 (1997); Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 922 (holding that a federally
funded Indian housing site, located on fee land adjacent to the tribe's reservation land, was not a dependent
Indian community).
69. See Venetie, 101 F.3d at1291; Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 919; South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839; Martine,
442 F.2d at 1023; Dana, 404 A.2d at 562.
70. See, e.g., Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1291; Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 919.
71. See, e.g., Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1291; Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 919.
72. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 5.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

be present regardless of whether the federal government has taken certain actions
towards the land in question.
The Martine Test
In United States v. Martine," the Tenth Circuit approved a district court's
flexible test for determining whether an area was a dependent Indian community.
The Martine test evaluates the following three elements:
[(1)] . . . the nature of the area in question;
[(2)] . . . the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to [the] Indian Tribes
and to the federal government; and
74
[(3)] ... the established practice of government agencies towards the area.

A.

Additionally, the court indicated that other factors may be relevant in determining
whether an area is a dependent Indian community; however, the court did not
provide insight into what these other factors might be."
In Martine, the Tenth Circuit held that the Navajo community of Ramah was
a dependent Indian community.76 In reaching this conclusion, the court did not
explicitly apply the test developed by the district court; rather, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the test adopted by the district court was consistent with the
77
Supreme Court's analysis in United States v. Sandoval. In other words, the
Tenth Circuit looked to Sandoval and determined that the elements of the Martine
test accurately assessed the relationship between the Ramah Navajo community
and federal legislative and executive agencies.78 In upholding and implicitly
applying the Supreme Court's Sandoval analysis, the Martine court did not adopt
the "set apart under the superintendence" language used by the Supreme Court in
its later McGowan decision.7 9
Because the Martine court did not explicitly apply the facts of the case to the
test which it adopted, it is difficult to determine which facts influenced the court
when it analyzed the relationship between the federal government and the Ramah
community. 0 However, it is possible to infer that the fact that the Ramah
community was located on land which the Navajo Nation purchased from a non-

73. See 442 F.2d at 1023.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See id. In Martine, several witnesses in the checkerboard area of western New Mexico observed the
defendant driving while intoxicated. See id. A Navajo police officer chased the defendant and the defendant
overturned his truck, killing the passenger. See id. The defendant was indicted in federal court for involuntary
manslaughter. See id. Since the felony did not occur on an Indian reservation or allotment, federal criminal
jurisdiction rested upon whether the checkerboard area was a dependent Indian community, and therefore Indian
country. See id. (The checkerboard area in question in Martine did "not lie within the boundaries of any
Indian Reservation," but was "a patchwork of land, some of which [was] owned by the Navajo Tribe, some of
which [was] not." Id.)
77. See id. (citing United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913)).
78. See id.
79. See United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 538 (1938). The reader should recall that McGowan
further developed the dependent Indian community concept created by Sandoval in 1913. See supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
80. See Martine, 442 F.2d 1022.
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Indian corporate owner, s 1 that the Navajo Nation held fee simple title to the
land, and that the federal government had not "set apart" the land for the Ramah
Navajo community8 2 did not preclude the Ramah community from being a
dependent Indian community. Therefore, an implicit holding of Martine is that
where a tribe purchases fee land and establishes an Indian community on it, the
inhabitants of the area may still have the requisite relationship to the federal
government to be considered a dependent Indian community.
The Martine
analysis focuses on the entire relationship between the federal government and an
Indian community and does not limit the dependent Indian community concept
to federally owned or "set apart" land."
The Martine decision represents an expansive interpretation of the dependent
Indian community concept.85 Because of the lack of explicit federal action
towards the land (e.g., taking the land in trust), the Navajo Ramah community did
not fit squarely within the reservation or Indian allotment concepts.8 6 However,
because of the community's relationship with the Navajo Nation and the federal
government, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the community constituted a
dependent Indian community.87 As a result of the Martine court's interpretation
of the breadth of the dependent Indian community concept, the88 concept remains
meaningful because it is distinct from the reservation concept.

81. See id at 1023.
82. See id.; see also Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 1995
WL 462232 at *6 (D. Alaska 1995) (indicating that the land in Martine "had never been set aside in any way
by the federal government for the tribe"), overruled by 101 F.3d 1286 (affirming that in Martine the tribe
purchased the land from entities other than the federal government), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
83. See Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023. The terms "dependence" and "superintendence" relate to the
relationship between an Indian community and the federal government. See Venetie, 1995 WL 462232 at * 13
(D. Alaska 1995) (holding that the territory held in fee simple by two native villages of Alaska was not a
dependent Indian community). When possible, this Comment will use the term "relationship" to refer to the
"dependency" or "superintendency" component of the dependent Indian community concept.
84. See Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023.
85. See id. The Martine court noted that in Sandoval, "the [Supreme] Court did not consider the question
of what other area[s] might also be defined as ... [dependent Indian communities]." Id. Several cases provide
additional insight into the Martine analysis. See United States v. Cook, 922 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding
that a six-mile tract of land established for the use and occupancy of the tribe in question, and inhabited by
3,000 tribal members who received federal assistance, was a dependent Indian community); Blatchford v.
Sullivan, 904 F.2d 542, 548-59 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the rural settlement of Yah-Ta-Hey, New Mexico,
located eight miles north of Gallup, New Mexico, and two miles south of the southern boundary of the Navajo
reservation, was not a dependent Indian community because "the Yah-Ta-Hey 'community' [was] born out of
opportunities for private commercial gain, [and] not born out of a public need to provide land for use,
occupancy, and protection of a dependent peoples"); United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1982)
(holding that Dana Point, Maine. located within a township owned primarily by the tribe and 94 percent
inhabited by Indians who received federal assistance, was a dependent Indian community).
86. See Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023.
87. See id. at 1023-24. The court may have been influenced by the fact that the Ramah Navajo community
was "typically seen as one of three satellite communities of the Navajo Reservation." Blatchford, 904 F.2d at
545 (holding that the rural community of Yah-Ta-Hey, located in northwestern New Mexico, was not a
dependent Indian community).
88. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 5.
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B.

The South Dakota Test
In United States v. South Dakota,8 9 the Eighth Circuit announced a test which
appears to be more restrictive than the broad Tenth Circuit Martine test.90 South
Dakota is significant because it has become the leading federal test for determining
whether a dependent Indian community exists. 9' The South Dakota analysis, while
incorporating the Martine factors, also considers the following factors:
(1) whether the United States has retained "title to the lands which it permits the
Indians to occupy" and "authority to enact regulations and protective laws
respecting this territory"; 92
(2) "the nature of the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the
area to Indian tribes and to the federal government, and the established practice
of government agencies toward the area";93
(3) whether there is "an element of cohesiveness ... manifested either by
economic pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as
supplied by that locality";' and
(4) "whether such lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy, and
protection of dependent Indian peoples." 95
In South Dakota, the Eighth Circuit held that a housing site located in Sisseton,
South Dakota was a dependent Indian community. 96 In reaching its decision, the
Eighth Circuit emphasized the relationship between the housing site, the site's
residents, and the federal government. 97 The court stressed that the site was
located on land held in trust by the federal government for the exclusive purpose of
building a federally funded housing site. 98 The court also emphasized that the
inhabitants of the site received services from the tribe and the federal government.99

89. 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981).
90. See id. at 839.
91. Of the federal circuits that have considered the question, the majority, including the Tenth Circuit, have
adopted the South Dakota analysis for determining whether a dependent Indian community exists. See, e.g.,
Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir.
1996) (adopting the South Dakota analysis over an alternative restrictive analysis proposed by the district court),
cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 2478 (1997); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 917 (1st.
Cir. 1996) (expressly adopting a modified version of the South Dakota analysis); Pittsburg & Midway Coal
Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1545 (10th Cir. 1995) (explicitly adopting the South Dakota analysis
rather than the Martine analysis adopted by the same court in 1971). Only the Second Circuit currently follows
the Martine analysis rather than the South Dakota test. See United States v. Cook, 922 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir.
1991).
92. South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839 (quoting Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211, 212 (1938)).
93. lI (quoting Weddell, 636 F.2d at 212); see Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023.
94. South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839 (quoting Weddell, 636 F.2d at 212-13).
95. I. (quoting Weddell, 636 F.2d at 213).
96. d at 838-39. As in Martine, the South Dakota court did not rigidly apply its test to the facts of the case
before it; rather the court deviated slightly from the test which it had announced. See id. at 843.
97. See id. at 840.
98. See id. at 839.
99. See id. at 840. The tribe and federal government provided numerous services and programs to the
inhabitants of the site. See id. The court also recognized that the City of Sisseton provided services to the
housing site, and that residents of the housing site had social and economic connections to the City of Sisseton.
See id. at 841. Nevertheless, the state's provision of services did not prevent the housing site from being
considered a dependent Indian community. See id. at 843.
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In opposition, the state argued that the housing site was not a dependent Indian
community because: (1) non-Indians were permitted to live at the site; (2)
continued existence of the site depended on United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development funding; and (3) state agencies had consistently asserted
jurisdiction over the site." The court expressly rejected these arguments,
stating: "'The test for determining what is a dependent Indian community must
be a flexible one, not tied
to any single technical standard[,] such as [the]
0
percentage of Indians." '
Additionally, the state asserted that the housing site was not a dependent Indian
community because "the federal government's only action toward the project was
the acceptance of the [land in] trust."'0 2 The court rejected this argument, as
well, because "[tihe district court specifically found that many of the tribal
programs provided to the project residents are provided under contract with the
federal government, through the [Bureau of Indian Affairs] and [Indian Health
Services]."'0 3
The state's argument in South Dakota regarding the trust status of the land
provides insight into the ambiguity currently surrounding the dependent Indian
community concept. Ten years after the South Dakota decision, in Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,'(4 the Supreme Court
held that trust land qualified as a reservation for purposes of tribal immunity from
state taxation because trust land was "set apart" by the federal government. 05
In applying the Supreme Court's holding in Potawatomi to the South Dakota
housing site, the site appears to qualify as both a reservation and a dependent
Indian community for the purposes of tribal immunity from state taxation. Thus,
the Supreme Court's decision in Potawatomi illustrates that the reservation and
dependent Indian community concepts overlap in two ways.' 0 6 First, it is
evident that "[a]ll Indian reservations are also dependent Indian communities
unless they are uninhabited.' 0 7 For example, if the federal government
establishes a reservation for an Indian tribal community, the community also
would qualify as a dependent Indian community." s
Second, all dependent Indian communities are not reservations, unless either
federal ownership or "set apart" is required for a dependent Indian community to

100. See id at 842. The state also argued "that the entire City of Sisseton, rather than the housing project,
[was] the proper community of reference for determining whether a dependent Indian community exist[ed] ....
Mhe [housing] project lack[ed] the cohesiveness that is essential to a community because it relie[d] on the
[C]ity... for all vital services." Id. at 841. However, the court refused to consider this argument because the

state raised it for the first time on appeal. See id
101. Id. at 842 (quoting United States v. Mound, 477 F. Supp. 156. 160 (D.S.D. 1979)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 842.

104. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
105. See id. at 511.
106. Additionally, applying Potawatomi to the facts of McGowan, an Indian colony located on federal trust

land may qualify both as a reservation and as a dependent Indian community. See United States v. McGowan,
302 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1938). Thus, McGowan provides an additional example of the overlap in the reservation
and dependent Indian community concepts. See id.
107.

COHEN. supra note 10, at 38.

108. See id
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exist.' °9 In other words, if federal ownership or "set aside" of the land is not
required for the establishment of a dependent Indian community, not all
dependent Indian communities will be included within the definition of an Indian
reservation." The Tenth Circuit's decision in Martine illustrates this second
point. As discussed above, in Martine, the Tenth Circuit adopted a test which
evaluates the entire relationship between the federal government and the tribal
community."' Although the Martine analysis includes an evaluation of "the
nature of the area in question,"'' 2 an implicit holding in Martine was that lack
of federal ownership or "set apart" of land does not preclude finding a dependent
Indian community. If the Martine court had required either federal ownership or
"set apart" of the land, the dependent Indian community concept and the
reservation concept would be no different-and, as a result,
the dependent Indian
3
community concept would be of limited significance."
The South Dakota analysis may represent a more restrictive test than the broad
Martine analysis. Unlike Martine, which relied entirely upon United States v.
1 4 the South Dakota analysis explicitly incorporated language from
Sandoval,"
United States v. McGowan." 5 The South Dakota analysis assesses, among other
things: (1) "whether the United States has retained 'title to the lands . .. [j-,,6
and (2) "'whether such lands have been set apart for ... Indian peoples.""' ' 7
If either of these two elements is required before a dependent Indian community
can exist, then the South Dakota analysis is more restrictive than the Martine test
because it limits the dependent Indian community concept to a specific status of
land.
However, it could be argued that the South Dakota test does not limit the
dependent Indian community concept. While the South Dakota court explicitly
adopted elements regarding the status of the land in question; the court
emphasized that "'[t]he test for determining what is a dependent Indian
community must be a flexible one, not tied to any single technical standard[,]
such as the percentage of Indian occupants.""'"
It is unclear whether the
flexibility endorsed by the court applies to all of the South Dakota dependent
Indian community elements, or only to the percentage of Indian occupants
standard." 9 It could be argued that the flexibility principle applies to the entire

109. See Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 511.
110. See United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971).
111. See id. The Tenth Circuit no longer follows Martine. See Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v.
Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1545 (10th Cir. 1995) (expressly adopting the South Dakota analysis); see also
Blatchford v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1990) (implicitly adopting South Dakota analysis).
112. See id
113. See Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 511 (holding that trust land set apart by the federal government was
equivalent to a reservation).
114. See Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023.
115. See United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 842 (8th Cir. 1981); Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023.
116. South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839 (quoting Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211, 212 (8th Cir. 1980));
see United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938).
117. South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839 (quoting Weddell, 636 F.2d at 213); see United States v. Mound, 477
F. Supp. 156. 158 (D.S.D. 1979); Youngbear v. Brewer, 417 F. Supp. 807, 809 (N.D. Iowa 1976), affid, 549
F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1977)).
118. South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 842 (quoting Mound, 477 F. Supp. at 160).
119. See id
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South Dakota analysis, and that the Indian occupant percentage standard was just
one example of a standard to which the flexible approach should apply, as
evidenced by the South Dakota court's use of the language "such as."'120 As a
result, under the South Dakota test, if a fact scenario similar to Martine existed,
the lack of both federal ownership and a "set apart" of land might not preclude
finding a dependent Indian community." Therefore, assuming the flexibility
principle applies throughout the South Dakota analysis, the dependent Indian
community concept would remain intact. 22
C.

Modifications of the South Dakota Test

1. The NarragansettTest
23
In NarragansettIndian Tribe of Rhode Island v. NarragansettElectric Co.,
the First Circuit modified the South Dakota analysis. Starting from the South
Dakota analysis, the First Circuit held that a federally funded Indian housing site
located on fee land adjacent to the tribe's reservation land was not a dependent
Indian community. 24 The court divided the South Dakota elements into two
categories, stating that "the second and third [South Dakota] factors weigh
whether there is, in fact, an Indian community, and the first and fourth [South
Dakota factors determine] whether [the Indian community] is a dependent
one.''1" In addition to categorizing the South Dakota factors, the First Circuit
transformed the South Dakota analysis from a functional test into a formalistic
one by concluding that a- dependent Indian community can exist only if the
federal government either owns the land or the amount of federal control

120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1990). In Blatchford, the Tenth Circuit
implicitly adopted the South Dakota analysis and held that the rural community of Yah-Ta-Hey, located in
northwestern New Mexico, was not a dependent Indian community. See id. at 548-49. In reaching its decision,
the Tenth Circuit implied that the entire relationship between the federal government and in Indian community,
rather than mere status of the land, is the fundamental consideration in determining whether an Indian
community is a dependent Indian community. See id. at 549. Although the court held that the community was
not a dependent Indian community, the court distinguished the facts of the case from situations "in which
dependent Indian communities were located on tribal lands or tribal trust lands and were created by the Indians
themselves or the federal government to provide for their economic and political protection." Id. In this
statement, the Tenth Circuit implied that the entire South Dakota analysis is flexible and does not limit the
dependent Indian community concept to land either owned or "set apart" by the federal government; rather, land
title is only one factor, out of many, included to assess the entire relationship between the federal government
and an Indian community. See id.
122. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 5.
123. 89 F.3d 908, 917-22 (1st Cir. 1996). In an earlier decision, the First Circuit followed the Martine
analysis. See United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1982). In Narragansett, however, the First
Circuit expressly endorsed the South Dakota analysis. See Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 917.
124. See Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 922. In Narragansett, the State of Rhode Island and the Town of
Charlestown sought a permanent injunction prohibiting the tribe and tribal housing authority from "constructing
a housing complex without obtaining various permits and approvals pursuant to state law and local ordinances."
Id at 911. In regard to land status, "the Tribe had applied for trust status, but ...the application had not yet
been granted." Id. Because the housing site was neither part of a reservation nor an allotment, state and local
authority to exercise jurisdiction over the housing site depended upon whether the site was a dependent Indian
community and therefore Indian country. See id. at 915. If the housing site was a dependent Indian community,
"the State presumptively lacks jurisdiction to enforce .. . regulations and ordinances ....
. Id.
125. Id at 917.
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26
exercised over the land is sufficient to "set aside" the area in question.
Again, the status of the land is the dispositive issue.
The Narragansettcourt adopted the federal ownership or "set aside" of the land
requirement because it determined that federal control over the land was the only
accurate measure of federal intent to recognize the existence of a dependent
Indian community.127 Federal intent was important to the court because the
court concluded that Indian tribes lacked the authority to unilaterally create Indian
country. 2 ' Thus, under Narragansett,absent the requisite federal intent to
create Indian country, evidenced by federal control of the land, a dependent
Indian community cannot exist'2 9
The Narragansettcourt's analysis of whether an Indian community is
dependent upon the federal government also is significant because it represents
a shift towards a restrictive interpretation of the dependent Indian community
concept, and a rejection of the broad Martine analysis."3 The court began its
analysis of the dependency issue by asking "whether the United States has
The
retained 'title to the lands which it permits the Indians to occupy.""'..
Narragansettcourt concluded that this element weighed against classifying the
area at bar as a dependent Indian community because the tribe, rather than the
federal government, held title to the land. 32 The court, however, confirmed
that who held the title to the land was not dispositive in determining whether an
area is a dependent Indian community, stating that "the fact that the [t]ribe, [and]
not the [federal] government, owns the land does' 33not preclude a finding that the
housing site is a dependent Indian community."'
The Narragansettcourt next discussed "whether such lands have been set apart
for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples.' ' 34 Up
until the analysis of this element, the court had applied a balancing test. 35 In
applying the "set apart" element, however, the court departed from its balancing

126. See id at 918-22.
127. See id
128. See id. The Narragansett court did not explain its conclusion that tribes lack the sovereign authority
to unilaterally create Indian country. However, it could be argued that Indian tribes cannot unilaterally create
Indian country because tribes have been implicitly divested of the sovereign authority to expand their territory.
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (discussing the doctrine of implicit
divestiture). Tribes have been implicitly divested of sovereign powers involving various relations between tribal
members and nonmembers. For example, tribes can no longer freely alienate the land they own and occupy to
non-Indians. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-68 (1974). The rationale for
the implicit limitation on tribal sovereignty "restis] on the fact that the dependent status of Indian tribes within
...[United States) territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to
determine their external relations." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). Thus, it appears that,
in Narragansett, the implicit divestiture analysis was implicitly extended to prevent tribes from unilaterally
creating Indian country.
129. See Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 918-22.
130. See id. at 918. Before discussing the dependency issue, the court applied the facts of the case to the
second and third South Dakota elements and determined that an Indian community existed. See id. at 917-18.
131. See id at 918 (quoting United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981)).
132. See Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 918.
133. 1d The court distinguished between federal ownership and land "set apart" because of several previous
court decisions indicating that tribal ownership of land did not preclude finding a dependent Indian community.
See id at 918-19.
134. See id at 918-19; see also South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839.
135. See Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 917-19.
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analysis and concluded that this element was the critical factor in determining
whether the housing site was a dependent Indian community.' 36 In reaching this
conclusion, the court looked to broad language from Oklahoma Tax Commission
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, where the Supreme Court stated:
"[T]he test for determining whether land is Indian country does not turn upon
whether that land is denominated 'trust land' or 'reservation.' Rather we ask
whether the area has been "'validly set apart for the' ' 3use of the Indians as
such, under the superintendence of the Government."
This broad statement by the Supreme Court implicitly supports the Narragansett
court's conclusion that a3 dependent Indian community cannot exist absent federal
"set apart" of the land. 1
The First Circuit then proceeded to determine what constituted a federal "set
apart" of land. 13 9 In making this determination, the court looked to Buzzard v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission,'o a Tenth Circuit decision. In Buzzard, the court
stated that "land is validly set apart for the use of Indians as such only if the
federal government
takes some action indicating that the land is designated for
14
use by Indians."' 1
The Narragansettcourt next proceeded to define the amount of federal action
necessary to satisfy the "set apart" element. 142 Relying upon language from the
federal district court's decision in Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, a dependent Indian community
case, 43 the Narragansettcourt indicated that the "set apart" requirement is met
136. See id. at 921.
137. Id. at 919 (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511
(1991) (holding that trust land qualifies as a reservation for tribal immunity from state taxation)); see United States
v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978) (holding that land placed in trust by the federal government and declared to
be a reservation by the Secretary of the Interior was Indian country); cf.Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox
Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1993) (holding that, absent congressional authorization, a state could not tax tribal
members who live and work within Indian country).
The First Circuit also looked to its prior decision in United States v. Levesque, where it stated that the ultimate
issue is whether the facts show that the area was established "for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent
Indian[s]." Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 919 (citing United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1982)
("[W]hether the evidence shows that the area was established for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent
Indians" is the "ultimate issue.")). In Levesque, however, the First Circuit noted "that section 1151(b) mandates a
functional[, i.e., flexible,] inquiry into the nature of the community .. ."681 F.2d at 77.
138. See Alaska ex rel.
Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 1995 WL 462232
at *11 (D. Alaska 1995), overruled by 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
139. See Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 919-20.
140. See id. at 919 (citing Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 992 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1993)). In Buzzard,
the tribe claimed that the state could not tax cigarette sales from smokeshops operated by the tribe on fee land
subject to a restriction on alienation. See 992 F.2d at 1075. The Tenth Circuit held that the land was not Indian
country because the land had not been set apart for the tribe's use, under the superintendence of the federal government, even though the tribe's charter required the Secretary of the Interior's approval before the tribe could sell the
land. See id.
141. Buzzard, 992 F.2d at 1076. In Buzzard, the Tenth Circuit did not distinguish between federal control
of the land and the relationship between the federal government and the Indian community. See id. However,
Buzzard did not involve a dependent Indian community; therefore, the court was compelled to focus on the
federal government's conduct towards the land in question. See id.
142. Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 920.
143. See id. (citing Venetie, 1995 WL 462232 at "14 (holding that the territory held in fee simple by two
native villages of Alaska was not a dependent Indian community), overruled by 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 2478 (1997).
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when "the degree of congressional and executive control over the tribe is so
pervasive as to evidence an intention that the federal government, not the state,
be the dominant political institution in the area."'" Yet, in Venetie, the district
court used this language to describe the requisite relationshipbetween the federal
45
government and the Indian community, not federal control over the land.
Consequently, the Narragansettcourt did not distinguish between the federal
government's relationship with the Indian community and the federal
government's control of the land in question, thereby reducing the importance of
the relationship between the federal government and the inhabitants of an Indian
community.' 46
After merging the "federal government's control over the land" element with
the "relationship between the federal government and the Indian community"
element of the South Dakota test, the Narragansettcourt concluded that land
placed in trust by the federal government satisfies the "set apart" requirement
because "[taking land in trust is a considered evaluation and acceptance of
47
responsibility indicative that the federal government has 'set aside' the lands."'1
The court also acknowledged that there may be situations involving non-trust land
where there may be such an amount of federal supervision or control over the
land in question that the land is essentially "set apart."' 48
The First Circuit adopted the federal control over the land standard because of
its concern about the consequences of tribes possessing the authority to
unilaterally create Indian country simply by purchasing land. 49 The court
stated:
If the restriction against alienation were sufficient to make any land purchased
by the [tribe] Indian country, the [tribe] could remove land from state
jurisdiction and force the federal government to exert jurisdiction over that
land without either sovereign having any voice in the matter.,'0

144. Narragansett,89 F.3d at 920 (quoting Venetie, 1995 WL 462232 at *14).
145. See Venetie, 1995 WL 462232 at *11.
146. See Narragansett,89 F.2d at 920.
147. Id In determining that placing land in trust constituted a federal "set apart," the First Circuit looked
to Buzzard, where the Tenth Circuit emphasized the comprehensive federal involvement, review, and discretion

in the trust application process. See id. (citing Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 992 F.2d 1073, 1076) (10th
Cir. 1993)); see also 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 (1996) (providing the procedures and requirements for the Secretary of

the Interior to place land in trust for the benefit of individual Indians and Indian tribes).
148. Narragansett,89 F.3d at 920-21. The court acknowledged that such a situation existed in an Oklahoma
Supreme Court decision, Housing Authority of the Seminole Nation v. Harjo, 790 P.2d 1098 (Okla. 1990). See

Narragansett,89 F.3d at 920. In Harjo, the court held that a house located on land deeded to a state agency
was part of a dependent Indian community because the federal government continued its superintendence of the
land through comprehensive federal regulations. See Harjo, 790 P.2d at 1101. The First Circuit, however,
distinguished Narragansettfrom Harjo, stating:

[T]he Tribe has pointed to no such comprehensive [federal] superintendence. Further,
although the lands in Harjowere not held in trust, they were not purchased from third parties,
as in the present case. Instead, they were originally part of Harjo's restricted Indian
allotment, and the portions of the allotment [Harjo] did not use remained restricted, a much
closer link to government control than the Tribe demonstrates here.
Narragansett,89 F.3d at 920.
149. See Narragansett,89 F.3d at 921.
150. Id. (quoting Buzzard, 992 F.2d at 1076) (alterations in Narragansett).
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Thus, the potential consequences of tribes unilaterally creating Indian country
influenced the court's decision.' 5'
Finally, the Narragansettcourt concluded that the dependency requirement of
the dependent Indian community concept was not met because the federal
government neither owned nor sufficiently controlled the land so that the land
could be said to be "set apart."' 5 2 The court stated:
It seems implausible that a tribe could obtain a valid claim to Indian country-and thus presumptive sovereignty rights--over theretofore privately-held lands
just by purchasing them and obtaining financial and other assistance from the
government for their development, without any opportunity for involvement
by the state, any negotiated agreements with respect to jurisdiction over the
land, or considered analysis by the federal government such as the one
described for the placement of lands in trust."
Thus, the Narragansettcourt determined that while the housing site was an Indian
community, it was not dependent upon the federal government-and, therefore,
not a "dependent Indian community. '
In summary, the Narragansettcourt disregarded the relationship between the
federal government and the Indian community. In doing so, the court concluded
that an Indian community is not dependent unless the federal government
intended the community to be dependent. 55 In determining federal intent, the
court looked to federal actions taken toward the land. Implicit in the court's
analysis are three land relationship schemes which are sufficient to evidence
federal intent to create a dependent Indian community. 5 6 First, there is
sufficient federal control if the federal government owns or holds title to the
land. 5 7 Second, sufficient federal control exists where the federal government
"sets apart" land, which includes the federal government taking land in trust for
a tribe' 5 Third, land also may be "set apart" if: (1) there is federal control
over tribal, or tribal member, land which the tribe did not purchase from a third
party; (2) the land was formally part of an individual allotment; and (3) the
federal government controls the land through pervasive federal regulations.' 5 9
As a result of the Narragansettcourt's analysis, the dependent Indian
community concept is of limited usefulness. It is difficult to imagine situations
where the requisite federal control over the land would exist without the
151. See ict The court acknowledged the existence of "[Housing and Urban Development] and [Bureau of
Indian Affairs) financial assistance and supervision of a housing project that is more clearly tied to the
community's benefit than the smokeshops in Buzzard[;]" but, the court was not persuaded by this distinction.
See id. In Narragansett,the Indian community consisted of a housing site built on land which was neither
reservation, allotted, nor trust land. See id. at 912. If the court had held that the housing site, located on land
owned by the tribe in fee simple, was a dependent Indian community, then the tribe would have been able to
exercise presumptive sovereignty over the site at the exclusion of state environmental laws. See id. at 922.
152. See id, at 921-22.
153. Id. at 922.
154. See id
155. See id at 919-22.
156. See id at 921-22.
157. See id at 918.
158. See id at 922.
159. See id at 921-22.
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reservation concept also applying." ° One possibility, however, may be where
the federal government recognizes or designates fee land for the use and
occupancy of a tribe, as was the situation in Venetie.
2. The Venetie Test
In Alaska ex rel. Yukon FlatsSchool Districtv. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government, 6 ' the Ninth Circuit relied upon the South Dakota analysis and
determined that the territory held in fee simple by two native Alaskan villages
was a dependent Indian community.' 62 In reaching its decision, the court
modified the United States v. South Dakota test, stating: "[A] dependent Indian
community requires a showing of federal set aside and federal superintendence.
in the
These requirements are to be construed broadly and should be informed
163
factors[.]'
Dakota]
[South
the
of
consideration
a
by
particular case
In determining that both a federal "set aside" of land and federal supervision
were required, the Venetie court relied on Supreme Court precedent." 6 The
court stated:
A clear body of [Supreme] Court precedent emphasizes two central features
of the inquiry into whether a given area constitutes Indian country, as a
general matter: first, whether the territory is "validly set apart for the use of

160. See id. As discussed earlier, supra notes 104-113 and accompanying text, because of the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatoni Indian Tribe, Indian
communities located on federal trust land also may qualify as reservations. See 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991).
161. 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
162. See id. In Venetie, the State of Alaska in 1986 entered into a contract with a construction company to
build a school within the Native Village of Venetie. See id. at 1289. A year later, the tribe brought suit in tribal
court to collect the business activities tax which it imposed on the construction company. See id. at 1290. As
the party responsible for paying the tax, the State of Alaska declined to defend in tribal court and brought an
action in the United States District Court of Alaska for "declaratory and injunctive relief against the [tiribe."
Id The state asserted that the tribe lacked jurisdiction to assess the tax. See id The district court agreed and
granted a preliminary injunction. See id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, and held that the
tribe's ability to impose the tax depended upon whether the Venetie was a federally recognized tribe, and
whether it inhabited Indian country, as a dependent Indian community. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov't, 856 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1988). On remand, the district court determined that although the
Venetie was a tribe, it did not occupy Indian country because it was not a dependent Indian community. See
Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 1995 WL 462232 at *20 (D.
Alaska 1995), overruled by 101 F.3d 1286, 1302 (9th Cir. 1996) (Presumably, the tribe did not satisfy the Indian
country requirements by occupying a reservation or an allotment.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997). In
reaching its decision, the district court determined that a dependent Indian community cannot exist, unless: (1)
"a claim of Indian country is brought by an Indian tribe"; (2) "the tribe is under the active superintendence of
the federal government"; and (3) "the tribe has had land set aside by the federal government for its people as
natives." See Venetie, 1995 WL 462232 at * 11. The Alaska State Government has authorized $1 million to
appeal this case to the United States Supreme Court. See Knowles OK's Appeal Money, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 11, 1997, at B2, available in WESTLAW, ANCRG-DNEWS database.
163. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1294. The Ninth Circuit recognized one difference between the South Dakota
factors and the factors it endorsed: "[We] assess the 'degree of federal ownership and control' over the area
in question while ... [the South Dakota test] ask[s] whether the United States retains 'title' to the land in
question." Id. at 1292 (citing United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (1981)). For simplicity, this
Comment will refer to the factors approved by the Venetie court as the South Dakota analysis.
Moreover, the Venetie court noted that all of the South Dakota factors could be included within either the
"set aside" or superintendence factors; but, the court concluded "that a functional inquiry into federal set aside
and superintendence is better facilitated by a consideration of a wide range of factors." Id. at 1294.
164. See id. at 1291.
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the Indians as such," and second, whether the Natives who inhabit it are
"under the superintendence of the [federal] [g]overnment."' t6

The court recognized that Supreme Court precedent, after the 1948 certification
of the Indian country statute, did not directly address the dependent Indian
community concept.' Nonetheless, the court stated:
[W]e do not believe that courts should abandon the basic principles that have
informed their analysis of Indian country for decades just because they are
evaluating the status of an area that does not fit neatly into section 1151 (a)
[reservations] or (c) [allotments]. Clearly, the Supreme Court has stressed the
importance of an inquiry into whether tribal land was set aside by the federal
government and whether the Natives who inhabit it are under the superintendence of the federal government. 167

Thus, the Venetie court rejected the notion that the dependent Indian community
concept required an analysis entirely distinct from other forms of Indian
country. 69

After establishing that the federal "set apart under the supervision" analysis was
required for the dependent Indian community concept, the court attempted to
provide insight into the parameters of the requirements. 69 The court
determined that "these requirements should be construed broadly" in accordance
with United States v. Sandoval and United States v. McGowan, the cases upon

which section 1151(b) (dependent Indian communities) was based.170 The court
noted that Sandoval and McGowan avoided "a formalistic assessment of the status
of tribal land and adopted a more functional approach to the problem of Indian
country that focuses on dependence as the primary consideration."' 7'
The Venetie court then discussed the "set aside" requirement.' 72 Like the
Narragansettcourt, and in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in
Sandoval, the court recognized:

165. Id (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511
(1991) (holding that trust land qualifies as a reservation for tribal immunity from state taxation) (second
alteration in Venetie)); see United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 (1978) (finding that land placed in trust by
Congress and declared to be a reservation by the Secretary of the Interior was Indian country); United States
v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938) (holding that the Reno Indian Colony, located on a tract of land that
the United States purchased and held in trust for the Colony, was a dependent Indian community); United States
v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914) (holding that a single trust allotment qualified as Indian country).
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit in Venetie was persuaded by the approach developed by the district court.
The district court relied "primarily on John and Potawatomi' and adopted the land "set apart" and supervision
requirements. See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1292. The Ninth Circuit stated: "The most plausible reading of the
caselaw supports the district court's approach." Id.
166. See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1292.
167. Id The court added: "Indeed, in McGowan, a case concerning a dependent Indian community that was
decided prior to the enactment of [18 U.S.C.] section 1151, the Court enunciated precisely these criteria." Id.
168. See id
169. See id.
170. See id. at 1293 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Historical and Revision Notes, 1948 Act (1994)); see also
McGowan, 302 U.S. at 539; United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 34 (1913); supra notes 60-63 and
accompanying text.
171. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1293.
172. See id.
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[T]he fact that a tribe holds title to land in fee simple, without any restrictions
on alienation imposed by the federal government, should not in itself preclude
a finding that the land was "set aside" by the government. A per se 1refusal
Sandoval.13
to construe fee land as Indian country would conflict with
The court concluded that Sandoval did not preclude a general "set aside" requireaside
ment; instead, it found that Sandoval supported the position that a federal "set 74
country.'
Indian
as
land
that
designates
can include fee land when Congress
However, unlike the Narragansettcourt, the Venetie court did not discuss other
75
The court's statement
situations which satisfy the "set aside" requirement.'
that the "set aside" requirement should be interpreted broadly, however, may
indicate that only minimal federal recognition or designation of land for Native
76
use is necessary to satisfy the "set aside" requirement.
Based on its interpretation of Sandoval, the Venetie court concluded that when
77
it "set
Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA),
78
In rejecting the district court's
aside" land for the Alaska Natives.'
determination that the Venetie fee land was not set aside, the court explained:
[T]he purpose of the set-aside requirement is to ensure that Native groups do
not unilaterally claim rights over Indian country by requiring that Congress
at least recognize or designate the land at issue for Native use. On these
grounds, the argument that the government set aside the land is stronger in
this case than it is in either Sandoval or Martine, where the Tribes acquired
fee title from entities other than the government. Here, Congress specifically
has conferred the land at issue on the Natives by statute[, i.e., the
ANCSA].1 79
In accordance with Sandoval, the Venetie court also determined that the
"superintendence" requirement should be interpreted broadly.' 80 The court stated:
The superintendence requirement ... is designed to determine the extent to
which the traditional trust relationship between the federal government and
Native Americans remains intact in a particular case. There is no hard and

173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Id Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Venetie district court did not distinguish between land ownership and
"set aside"; rather, the court equated the two. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Alaska Native Village
of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 1995 WL 462232 at *20 (D. Alaska 1995). As a result, the district court was forced
to reconcile the Pueblo's fee simple land title in Sandoval with the land "set aside" requirement. In an attempt
to do so, the district court stated:
Congress . . . confirmed the bona fide claims of the Pueblo Indians and relinquished all
claims by the United States to their lands. By this act of confirmation Congress did not "set
aside" federal lands for the use and occupancy of Indians .... [Rather,] Congress ... itself
declared the Pueblo lands to be Indian country.
Id. Thus, the district court unconvincingly attempted to eliminate the possibility of tribal fee land qualifying as
Indian country. See id

175. See id. at *9.
176. See id. at *7, 11.
177. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1994).
178. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Alaska Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d
1286, 1295 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629
(1994)), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 2478 (1997).
179. Id. at 1296.
180. See id at 1293.
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fast rule for determining how involved the trust relationship must be to
constitute the requisite level of superintendence.'
The court added that "the litmus test of federal superintendence is whether the
federal government has abandoned its trust responsibilities."''8 2 The court
concluded that the ANCSA did not terminate the trust relationship between the
federal government and Alaska Natives, and, therefore, federal superintendence
existed.8 3 Thus, unlike the Narragansettcourt, the Venetie court, in adopting
the "superintendence" requirement, distinguished between federal set apart of the
land and the federal government's relationship with inhabitants of an Indian
community.
Finally, after concluding that the ANCSA "neither eliminated a federal set aside
for Alaska Natives, as such, nor terminated federal superintendence over Alaska
Natives[,]" the Venetie court stated that "Indian country still may exist in
Alaska."' 4 The court recognized that because the ANCSA did "not extinguish
Indian country in Alaska as a general matter . . . [,J when we accord a broad
interpretation to set aside and superintendence, the district court's factual findings
actually support the determination that the land owned by the Venetie is Indian
country.' 8 5 The court "proceed[ed] to illustrate this point by examining the
relevant factors of the

. .

. [South Dakota analysis], mindful of the overarching

prerequisites to a dependent Indian community[:] set aside and superintendence.' ' 186 The court applied the facts of the case to the South Dakota
factors:
Venetie meets the set aside and superintendence requirements of the
dependent Indian community test. Although the federal government no longer

owns or controls the former Venetie Reservation, every other factor of our

inquiry supports the conclusion that Venetie occupies Indian country: Venetie
has a special "use and occupancy" relationship to its land; the inhabitants of
Venetie maintain "significant contacts and relationships" with numerous
federal agencies; the federal government continues to be involved in the

affairs of the Neets'aii Gwich'in; the high degree of cohesiveness among its
inhabitants indicates that Venetie is a strong and distinct Native community;
and the reunification of Venetie with its former reservation land via a
statutory mechanism provided by Congress demonstrates that the land has

been set aside for Indians, as such.'8 7

181. Id. at 1296. In adopting this superintendence standard, the court expressly rejected the district court's
determination that "federal superintendence must be 'pervasive,' meaning that it be the 'dominant political
institution' in the area as compared to the state." Id. at 1293.
182. Id. at 1297.
183. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the court evaluated the plain language and legislative history of the
ANSCA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1994), along with the continued federal relationship with Alaska Natives.
See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1297-99. In addition, the court determined that the "ANCSA also implemented the
federal policy of self-determination without termination of the trust relationship." Id. at 1299.
184. Id. at 1299-1300.
185. Id. at 1300.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1302 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the court concluded that "Venetie is a dependent Indian community and
that, accordingly, its territory qualifies as Indian country.''
In summary, similar to the Narragansettdecision, the Venetie analysis adopted
the "set aside" requirement in lieu of the broader Martine relationship-centered
analysis. 8 9 Relying heavily on Sandoval, the Venetie court indicated that fee
land is "set aside" if the federal government recognizes or designates the land
Indian country.' 90 Although the court indicated that the narrow "set aside"
requirement should be interpreted broadly, the court failed to discuss other
requirement.' 9 '
situations where federal action would satisfy the "set aside"
Thus, the Venetie decision offers limited insight into the "set aside" requirement.
The Narragansettdecision, however, indicates that an Indian community located
on federal trust land qualified as "set aside;" but, as discussed previously, the
community also would qualify as a reservation. 92
Because of the federal "set aside" requirement in the Narragansettand Venetie
decisions, it is apparent that the dependent Indian community concept is of
limited importance to the First and Ninth Circuits. Pursuant to the Narragansett
and Venetie courts' analyses, the dependent Indian community concept may be
relevant merely in unique situations, such as those involving the Pueblos of New
Mexico t93 or Alaska Natives, 9 4 where the land in question does not fit
squarely into the reservation concept.
However, if the expansive Martine interpretation of the dependent Indian
community concept is adopted by federal and state courts, the concept may
remain relevant beyond limited, novel circumstances. The next section questions
the soundness of the "set aside" requirement.
IV. CRITICISM OF THE "SET ASIDE" REQUIREMENT
A review of dependent Indian community case law indicates that challenging
the validity of the "set aside" requirement, as applied to the dependent Indian
community concept, presents a formidable task. Although the Supreme Court has
not expressly stated that the "set aside" requirement is essential to the concept,
broad statements by the Court in reservation cases imply that the "set aside"
requirement applies to all of Indian country-of which dependent Indian
communities are a part. 95 Also, a majority of the federal circuits that have
considered the question have adopted variants of the South Dakota analysis which
incorporate the "set aside" element. 96 Thus, with the exception of the 1971

188. Id.
189. See id. at 1294
190. See idt at 1293-94.
191. See id at 1294.
192. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 920 (1st Cir. 1996); see also
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991).
193. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45 (1913).
194. See Venetie, 101 F.3d 1286.
195. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993); Potawatomi, 498 U.S.
at 511; United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 (1978); United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938);
United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442. 449 (1914); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 269 (1913).
and III.C.2.
196. See supra Parts III.C.1
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Tenth Circuit Martine decision, a majority of federal circuits have refused to
interpret the dependent Indian community concept in an expansive manner. 9 '
Nonetheless, the restrictive interpretation may be challenged on three grounds.
First, the courts' reliance on reservation cases rather than dependent Indian
community cases is suspect. Second, the courts' reliance on McGowan is
questionable. Third, the courts' concerns about tribes having unilateral power to
create Indian country are unwarranted.
A.

Reliance on Reservation Precedent
The Narragansettand Venetie courts' conclusions that the federal government
must "set aside" land for a dependent Indian community to exist should be
reconsidered. First, the courts' reliance upon Supreme Court precedent involving
the reservation concept is subject to examination. 98 In adopting the "set aside"
requirement, the Narragansettand Venetie courts relied upon the Supreme Court's
broad statement that the test for the existence of Indian country was "whether the
area has been 'validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the
superintendence of the Government."" 99 This statement implicitly supports the
courts' rulings that the "set aside" requirement limits the dependent Indian
community concept. 2°°
However, since codification of the Indian country statute, 20 ' the Supreme
Court has not addressed the issue of what constitutes a dependent Indian
community, and therefore, has not expressly mandated that the "set aside"
requirement governs whether a dependent Indian community exists. 2 2 The
Venetie court acknowledged this, and explained:
[W]e do not believe that courts should abandon the basic principles that have
informed their analysis of Indian country for decades just because they are
evaluating the status of an area that does not fit neatly into [section] 1151 (a)
[reservations] or (c) [allotments]. Clearly, the Supreme Court has stressed the
importance of ...[this] inquiry .... 203
The Venetie court's explanation, however, assumes that the reservation and
dependent Indian community concepts are so similar that the "set aside"
requirement governs both concepts.2°
The court's assumption is questionable unless the reservation concept is
indistinguishable from the dependent Indian community concept. If the
parameters of the two concepts are identical, the "set aside" requirement may

197. See supra Parts III.C.I and III.C.2. The Tenth Circuit is currently among this majority. See supra note
111.
198. In Venetie, the court also relied upon McGowan, where the United States Supreme Court endorsed the
federal "set apart" and supervision analysis. See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1291 (citing McGowan, 302 U.S. at 539).
For a discussion of McGowan, see discussion infra Part IV.B.
199. See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Potawaromi, 498 U.S. at 511); Narragansett Indian Tribe v.
Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 919 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Potawatoin, 498 U.S. at 511).
200. See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1294.
201. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1170 (1994).
202. See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1292.
203. Id. at 1293.
204. See id
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limit both concepts. However, if the parameters of the two concepts are
distinguishable, determining whether an area is a dependent Indian community
should require a different analysis than determining whether a reservation exists.
Therefore, the validity of the Narragansettand Venetie courts' reliance on
Supreme Court reservation precedent depends upon whether a meaningful
distinction can be made between the reservation and dependent Indian community
concepts.
As discussed earlier, the dependent Indian community and reservation concepts,
20 5 It is evident that all
as they have been defined by the courts, overlap.
26
inhabited Indian reservations are dependent Indian communities. 0 The primary
issue, then, is whether all dependent Indian communities are Indian reservations.
It is apparent that not all dependent Indian communities are reservations, unless
a federal "set aside" of land is required.2 7
Principles of statutory construction support the position that the reservation and
dependent Indian community concepts are not identical. When Congress codified
the Indian country statute, it explicitly divided Indian country into three separate
categories: (1) Indian reservations; (2) dependent Indian communities; and (3)
individual Indian allotments.2 8 Therefore, the structure of the Indian country
statute makes it clear that Indian country is comprised of three distinct categories
of land.2 9
Additionally, despite the similarities between the reservation and dependent
Indian community concepts, the different focus of each concept supports the
position that the concepts are distinguishable. The modern definition of a
"reservation" refers to "land set aside under federal protection for the residence
of tribal Indians, regardless of origin. '21" The Supreme Court's analysis in
Potawatomi implicitly supports the view that the primary focus of the reservation
concept is whether the federal government has set the land apart, by whatever
means, for the use of the tribe.2 1 In Potawatomi, the Supreme Court did not
explicitly address the superintendence issue. Instead, the Court stated: "As in
John, we find that this trust land is 'validly set apart' and thus qualifies as a
'
reservation for tribal immunity [from state taxation] purposes. "212 This state
ment indicates that a federal "set apart" of the land is the primary characteristic
of an Indian reservation.2 13
In contrast, dependency upon the federal government by the inhabitants of an
Indian community is the fundamental attribute of the dependent Indian community

205. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991); see
also COHEN, supra note 10, at 38 n.101. (indicating that a dependent Indian community may be equivalent to
an Indian reservation). For a discussion of Potawaromi,see supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
206. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 38.
207. See United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971).
208. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1170 (1994).
209. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.02, at 91 (5th ed. 1992 &

Cum.Supp. 1996).
210. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 34.
211. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991).
212. d
213. See id.; see also COHEN, supra note 10, at 34.
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concept.2 14 When Congress included "all dependent Indian communities" within
the definition of Indian country, it relied on Sandoval and McGowan." 5 In both
of these cases, the Supreme Court avoided "a formalistic assessment of the status
of tribal land and adopted a more functional approach to the problem of Indian
country that focuse[d] on dependence as the primary consideration. 2 16 Thus,
according to the Maine Supreme Court, instead of focusing on the status of the
land, Congress focused on the type of relationship existing between a tribe and
the federal government-Congress, "in express terms, made dependency,
comprehensively, a factor identifying . . . 'Indian country.""'2 " The dependent

Indian community concept, therefore, "refer[s] to residential Indian communities
under federal protection, not to types of land ownership or reservation
boundaries., 21 8 Hence, it appears that the reservation and dependent Indian
community concepts can be distinguished on the basis of the statutory structure
of the Indian country statute and the different focus of each concept.
B.

Undue Reliance Upon McGowan
Additionally, the Venetie court's reliance on McGowan in adopting the "set
aside" requirement, is questionable. The Venetie court stated: "[Iln McGowan,
a case concerning a dependent Indian community that was decided prior to the
enactment of [section] 1151, the Court enunciated... [the set aside of land and
superintendence requirement]. 2 ' 9 Thus, the court indicated that McGowan
220
supported requiring the "set aside" requirement.
However, recall that Congress codified the dependent Indian community
concept based upon both Sandoval and McGowan.2" In Sandoval, the Supreme
Court concluded that those Indian communities which the legislative and
executive branches have treated in effect as dependent Indian communities, should
be treated by the courts as such.222 The Sandoval Court did not adopt a
technical test for determining whether an area is a dependent Indian
community.223 Rather, after the Sandoval Court analyzed the entire relationship
between the Pueblos of New Mexico and the federal government, it concluded
that Congress had the authority to prohibit the introduction of liquor into the
Pueblos because the United States had a duty to protect all dependent Indian
communities within its borders.224

214. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286,
1293 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997); Maine v. Dana, 404 A.2d 551, 557 (Me. 1979);
see also COHEN, supra note 10, at 39.
215. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Historical and Revision Notes, 1948 Act (1994).
216. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1293.

217. Dana, 404 A.2d at 558.
218. COHEN, supra note 10, at 39.
219. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1292 (citing United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938)).

220. See id at 1291.
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Historical and Revision Notes, 1948 Act (1994).

222. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46-47 (1913).
223. See id
224. See iad at 44-47.
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the
In McGowan, the Supreme Court also analyzed the relationship between
225 The
Colony.
Indian
Reno
the
community,
federal government and an Indian
Court stated that the "Indians in this [C]olony have been afforded the same
government as that given Indians in other settlements known as
protection by the
'reservations.' ' 226 Here, then, the Court again looked to the "in effect" or
functional results of the federal relationship rather than the formal requirement of
reservation/trust status. But, in contrast to Sandoval, the Court also looked to the
specific "set apart" prong under the "supervision" test followed by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Pelican, a 1914 allotment case.227
In Sandoval and McGowan the Supreme Court relied on different forms of
analyses; therefore, the two cases provide conflicting insight into the parameters
of the dependent Indian community concept.2' Moreover, even if the facts and
the Supreme Court's analyses in Sandoval and McGowan could be reconciled,
there is no indication that Congress intended for the dependent Indian community
22 9
Rather, Congress
concept to be limited to the facts of those two cases.
intended for the dependent Indian community concept to encompass "communities
which, while neither part of a federal reservation23nor Indian 'allotments,' are both
'Indian' in character and federally dependent." 0
Thus, the Venetie court's emphasis on McGowan is questionable. Arguably,
the focus of the dependent Indian community concept should be on the entire
relationship between the federal government and an Indian community, rather than
merely on the status of the land in question.
Unilateral Creation of Indian Country
The Narragansettand Venetie courts' concerns with Indian tribes unilaterally
creating Indian country make it difficult to challenge the "set aside" requirement.
As discussed previously, in expressing its concerns regarding tribes unilaterally
creating Indian country, the Narragansettcourt looked to Buzzard v. Oklahoma
Tax Commission,2 3 t a Tenth Circuit decision.
Considering the facts of Buzzard, the Tenth Circuit's concern with tribes
creating Indian country was legitimate. In Buzzard, the tribe claimed that the
state could not tax cigarette sales from smokeshops operated by the tribe on fee
land.232 The tribe purchased the fee land subject to a restriction that233it could
If the
not sell the land without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
C.

225. See United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
226. Id. at 538.

227. See id. at 538-39 (citing United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 445, 450 (1914)).
228. See McGowan, 302 U.S. at 538-39; Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46.
229. See United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971) ("[In Sandoval], [t]he Court did

not consider the question of what other areas might also be defined as [dependent Indian communities].); Maine
v. Dana, 404 A.2d 551, 557 (Me. 1979) ("We cannot agree, however, that when Congress in 1948 spoke
generally of 'dependent Indian communities' as the object of its exercise of power, its intendment was to
incorporate particular factors which happened to be present in Sandoval as indispensable elements of the
existence of a 'dependent Indian community."').
230. United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1982).
231. 992 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1993).
232. See id.at 1075.
233. See id
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court had held that the federal restriction on alienation of tribal lands, by itself,
evidenced federal intent to create Indian country, the result would have been that
tribes could create Indian country simply by purchasing fee land from third
parties.234 Because federal intent to create Indian
235 country was lacking in
Buzzard, the tribe attempted to create it unilaterally.
Even though Buzzard did not involve the dependent Indian community concept,
the Narragansettand Venetie courts applied the concerns raised in Buzzard to that
concept.2 36 In Narragansett,the court emphasized that if the housing site in
question was considered a dependent Indian community, the tribe would be able
to exercise "presumptive sovereignty" over the site "without any opportunity for
involvement by the state, any negotiated agreements with respect to jurisdiction
over the land, or considered analysis by the federal government such as the one
described for the placement of lands in trust. '237 The Narragansett court then
concluded that without federal ownership or "set aside" of land, which includes
federal trust land, the federal government does not evidence the requisite intent
to create a dependent Indian community. 23 8 Additionally, the Venetie court
concluded that the "set aside" requirement was essential to prevent tribes from
unilaterally creating Indian country and concluded that the federal government
must "at least recognize or designate the land at issue for Native use." 239
Thus, the Narragansett and Venetie courts determined that federal action
towards the land in question was an accurate measure of federal intent to create
a dependent Indian community. 24° As a result, the "set aside" requirement is
suspect only if an alternative, accurate measure of federal intent exists. Recall,
the Narragansettcourt rejected the possibility of an alternative measure when it
concluded that the relationship between the federal government and an Indian

234. See id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994)) (providing statutory restriction on alienation of tribal land).
235. See id. at 1076-77. In Dana, however, enrolled Passamaquoddy Indians argued that the state lacked
criminal jurisdiction because the alleged crime was committed within Indian country. See Maine v. Dana, 404
A.2d 551, 553 (Me. 1979). Because of the historical interaction between the tribe, the state, and the federal
government, the land at issue was not a federally recognized reservation. See id (citing Passamaquoddy Tribe
v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 377-78 (lst. Cir. 1975) (holding that the federal Nonintercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33,
1 Stat. 137 (1790) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994)), is a general act which extends to every tribe, and creates
a federal obligation to act as the guardian for dependent tribes, even if the federal government has not recognized

the tribe)). In Dana, the Maine Supreme Court relied upon the Passannquoddy holding to reject the state's
argument that the dependent Indian community concept was limited to tribes in a dependent relationship with
the federal government. See 404 A.2d at 557. The Dana court stated: "By acting, in 1948, as to all 'dependent
Indian communities,' . . . Congress acted generally to afford to each and every Indian community under its
guardianship, and therefore dependent upon it, ... protection." Id. Thus, the court determined that a dependent
Indian community can derive its dependency from the restrictions upon alienation contained in the 1790
Nonintercourse Act, and specific federal recognition of the tribe or the land is not required for a dependent
Indian community to exist. See id. at 562.
Presumably, if the Dana analysis were extended to non-eastern tribes, any land owned by a tribe with an
Indian community on it and subject to the restriction upon alienation contained in 25 U.S.C. section 177 (1994)
could be considered a dependent Indian community because of the federal obligations contained in the statute.
236. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286,
1292 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co.,
89 F.3d 908, 921 (1st Cir. 1996).
237. Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 922.
238. See id. at 921.
239. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1296.
240. See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1296; Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 922.
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community, including federal financial assistance and other services, did not alone
24
evidence federal intent to create a dependent Indian community. '
Despite the Narragansettcourt's conclusion, it could be argued that the
Narragansettand Venetie emphasis on express federal intent to create a dependent
Indian community is unwarranted because it disregards the focus of the dependent
Indian community concept.2 4 2 In contrast to the reservation concept,
dependency, or the entire relationship between the federal government and the
inhabitants of an Indian community, is the primary focus of the dependent Indian
community concept. 3 Thus, although federal control over land may clearly
indicate federal intent to create Indian country, contrary to the Narragansett
court's statements, the entire relationship between the federal government and an
Indian community should also constitute an adequate measure of federal intent to
confer Indian country status on an Indian community, despite the lack of federal
control over the land. 2' To conclude otherwise overlooks the primary focus of
the concept, which is community.
Moreover, the Narragansettcourt's concern that Indian tribes may unilaterally
create Indian country may be unwarranted as applied to the dependent Indian
245 First,
community concept because of the inherent limitations of the concept.
the existence of an Indian community is a primary limitation on the dependent
Indian community concept. 24 For example, the Indian community requirement
clearly prevents a factual situation such as the one contained in Buzzard v.
248
Oklahoma Tax Commission24 7 from being included within the concept.
Also, a mere group of Indians living together does not constitute an Indian
concept. 249
community within the meaning of the dependent Indian community
Rather, the requisite Indian community is limited to a cohesive community with
250
cultural, social, political, and economic relationships with an Indian tribe.
A second limitation on the concept is that a dependent Indian community will
not exist unless the federal government has some relationship with the Indian
community."' While the character of the requisite federal relationship with an
Indian community is a main issue of dispute, factors supporting the existence of
the requisite federal relationship include: (1) whether federal agencies provide or
241. See Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 922.
242. See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1291 (noting that dependency is the primary consideration); Maine v. Dana,
404 A.2d 551, 558 (Me. 1979) (noting that dependency is comprehensively a factor identifying Indian country);
COHEN, supra note 10, at 39 (noting that the dependent Indian community concept refer[s] to residential Indian
communities under federal protection, not to types of land ownership).
243. See COHEN, supra note 10, at 39.
244. See United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971); see also Dana, 404 A.2d at 526.
245. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151, Historical and Revision Notes, 1948 Act (1994).
246. See Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023; see also Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 917; United States v. South Dakota,
665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981).
247. 992 F.2d 1023 (loth Cir. 1993). For a description of Buzzard's facts, see supra notes 231-233 and
accompanying text.
248. See Buzzard, 992 F.2d at 1075 (involving a tribal smokeshop located on land purchased by the tribe).
249. See South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 843; see also Martine, 442 F.2d at 1024.
250. See South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 843.
251. See id But see Maine v. Dana, 404 A.2d 551, 562 (Me. 1979). In Dana, the Maine Supreme Court
determined that a dependent Indian community can derive its dependency from the protection of the federal
Nonintercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (codified at 25 U.S.C § 177 (1994)), regardless of the
relationship between the federal government and the Indian community. See id. at 557.
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offer financial assistance to the Indian community; (2) whether federal agencies
provide or offer services and programs to the Indian community; and (3) whether
federal agencies view the Indian community as a political or social sub-unit of a
federally recognized Indian tribe.2 52 These indicators would prevent a
community of Indians that lacks a relationship with the federal government from
being considered a dependent Indian community. Thus, although the test for
determining whether a dependent Indian community exists should remain flexible,
the necessity of both an Indian community and a relationship between that
community and the federal government restricts the dependent Indian community
concept to identifiable, dependent Indian communities.
In summary, despite the weight of precedent to the contrary, the Venetie and
Narragansettcourts' conclusions that the federal government must "set aside"
land for a dependent Indian community to exist should be reviewed. First, the
courts' reliance on Supreme Court precedent construing the reservation concept
is questionable because the parameters of the reservation concept are distinct from
the dependent Indian community concept. Second, the Venetie court's emphasis
on McGowan is suspect because of the Supreme Court's conflicting analysis in
Sandoval. Third, the courts' emphasis on tribes unilaterally creating Indian
country is unwarranted because it disregards the focus and the inherent limitations
of the dependent Indian community concept.
V. PROPOSED CHANGES
Assuming the "set aside" requirement does not govern the dependent Indian
community concept, an alternative form of analysis is preferable to the Martine
and South Dakota tests. The Martine and South Dakota tests can be revised into
a flexible test consisting of three broad elements: (1) the proper community of
reference; (2) whether an Indian community exists; and, assuming an Indian
community exists, (3) whether the entire relationship between the federal
government and the Indian community evidences the existence of a dependent
Indian3 community, regardless of the status of the land on which the community
25
lies.
Before a court can ascertain whether a dependent Indian community exists, it
should first determine the proper community of reference, that is, the geographical
252. See South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839. Martine, Narragansett, and Venetie illustrate that one of the
primary disputes regarding the dependent Indian community concept is what the requisite federal relationship
should be. In Martine, the court examined the entire relationship between the federal government and the
inhabitants of an Indian community. See United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1991). In
Narragansett, the court disregarded the relationship between the federal government and the inhabitants of the
Indian community, and concluded that the federal government's control of the land was the key relationship.
See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908. 918-19 (1st. Cir. 1996). In Venetie, even
though the court adopted the "set aside" requirement by also adopting the superintendence requirement, the court
emphasized that the relationship between the federal government and the inhabitants of the Indian community
was relevant. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Alaska Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't. 101

F.3d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
253. Determining the proper community of reference would be unnecessary if the geographic boundaries of
dependent Indian communities were limited to federally controlled land or land owned by Indian tribes.
However, "the full statute was intended to reduce earlier difficulties which had arisen from the 'checkerboarding'
of land ownership and rights-of-way. Thus, patented parcels of land and rights-of-way within dependent Indian
communities should also be within Indian country." COHEN, supra note 10, at 39.
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boundary of the community to be analyzed.'
In Pittsburg and Midway Coal
Mining Co. v. Watchman,255 the Tenth Circuit addressed the community of
reference issue. In doing so, the court adopted the following definition of
''community":
A community is a mini-society consisting of personal residences and an
infrastructure potentially including religious and cultural institutions, schools,
emergency services, public utilities, groceries, shops, restaurants, and other
needs, necessities, and wants of modem life.5 6
The Watchman definition of "community" has two components: (1) personal
residences and (2) infrastructure. Unless the infrastructure requirement is
interpreted liberally, the Tenth Circuit's definition of "community" is too
restrictive to be applied to the dependent Indian community concept because
many Indian communities lack a comprehensive infrastructure. For example, in
South Dakota, the housing site consisted primarily of federally funded housing
units to which the city provided services.257 Applying the Tenth Circuit's
definition of "community" to the facts of South Dakota, the city, rather than the
housing site, most likely would have been considered the proper community of
reference. 5 8 Moreover, if the city were considered the proper community of
reference, the housing site probably would not be considered a dependent Indian
community because the city might fail to satisfy the remaining requirements of
the dependent Indian community analysis. Therefore, courts should either
interpret the Tenth Circuit's infrastructure requirement liberally, or should apply
a different definition of "community."
A more workable definition of "community" was adopted by the Eighth Circuit
in United States v. South Dakota.259 The South Dakota definition considers
"whether there is an element of cohesiveness . . . manifested either by economic
pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by
that locality., 260 This definition is flexible enough to be applied to the
dependent Indian community concept because it does not require the community
to have a comprehensive infrastructure.26'
After a court determines the proper community of reference, it should
determine whether an Indian community exists. In determining whether an Indian
community exists, the court should focus on the relationship that the inhabitants
of the community of reference have with the Indian tribe of which the community
inhabitants are members.2 62 This element includes an analysis of the

254. For instance, in United States v. South Dakota, the state argued that the "entire City of Sisseton, rather

than the housing project, is the proper community of reference for determining whether a dependent Indian
community exists." 665 F.2d at 838. However, the Eighth Circuit refused to consider the state's argument
because the state had not raised the issue before the lower court. See id.
255. 52 F.3d 1531, 1543 (10th Cir. 1995).
256. Id at 1544.
257. See South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839.
258. See id. at 839-41.
259. See id
260. See id at 839.
261. See id
262. See id.
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inhabitants' cultural, economic, social, and political relationships with their
tribe. 263 Also, the geographic proximity of the inhabitants' community to their
tribe's current reservation land is relevant. 264
If an Indian community exists, then a court should evaluate the entire
relationship between the Indian community and the federal government. 265 As
discussed earlier, this relationship includes: (1) an evaluation of the primary
purpose of the community; (2) whether federal agencies provide or offer financial
assistance to an Indian community; (3) whether federal agencies provide or offer
services and programs to an Indian community; and, (4) whether federal agencies
treat the Indian community as a political or social sub-unit of a federally
recognized Indian tribe. 2 "
In determining whether a dependent Indian community exists, courts must keep
in mind that "[t]he test for determining what is a dependent Indian community
must be a flexible one, not tied to any single technical standard .... 267
Because the analysis is flexible, courts must determine whether a dependent
Indian community exists on a case by case basis.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMUNITY FROM STATE TAXATION
The dependent Indian community issue arises in tribal immunity from state
taxation cases. The form of analysis utilized to determine whether an area is a
dependent Indian community will govern whether tribal or tribal member
activities outside the boundary of reservations or individual allotments are
immune from state taxation. 2"
The Narragansettand Venetie "set apart" requirement mandates that the federal
government exercise control over the land, which includes federal ownership, trust
land, or fee land designated as Indian country by Congress. 269 In a tax context,
if the federal land "set aside" analysis is required, tribal and tribal activities within
Indian communities will not be exempt from state taxation unless the federal
government adequately controls the land in question. Narragansettprovides an
excellent example of this.27°
Even though the formalistic "set aside" requirement limits the scope of the
dependent Indian community concept, there is a benefit to a formalistic analysis.
The formal "set aside" requirement provides predictability in determining whether
an area is a dependent Indian community for tribal and tribal member immunity
from state taxation. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, the
Supreme Court recognized the value of predictability in the area of tax
263. See id
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See Housing Auth. of the Seminole Nation v. Hajo, 790 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Okla. 1990) (citing South
Dakota, 665 F.2d at 839).
267. See South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 842.
268. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S.Ct. 2214 (1995).
269. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't. 101 F.3d 1286, 1292
(9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 2478 (1997); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89
F.3d 908, 920 (1st Cir. 1996).
270. Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 912 (describing the district court's analysis in concluding that the State of
Rhode Island's Building and Zoning regulations applied to the Wetowmuck Housing Authority were preempted).
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administration when it endorsed the "legal incidence test. ,2 ' The Court stated:
"[O]ur focus on a tax's legal incidence accommodates the reality that tax
administration requires predictability. 272 Thus, the Narragansettand Venetie
"set aside" requirement may clarify the extent of a state's authority to tax a
geographical area.
In contrast to a formalistic test, a flexible analysis does not restrict the
dependent Indian community concept to land "set aside" by the federal
government.27 3 Instead, regardless of whether the federal government has acted
towards the land in question, the existence of an Indian community and federal
involvement within the community are the determinative factors in deciding
whether an area is a dependent Indian community.2 74 Consequently, if a
flexible analysis is adopted, tribal and tribal member activities within an Indian
community may be exempt from state taxation even though the federal
government does not own or has not "set aside" the land in question.
However, tribes face several difficulties under a flexible analysis. First,
flexibility produces a substantial amount of judicial discretion. For example, the
second element of the proposed analysis requires the court to determine whether
an "Indian community" exists. As a result, courts would have to determine
whether a community is sufficiently "Indian" to be considered an Indian
community. This would invite outsider measures of "Indianness" and of
community. Second, flexibility results in uncertainty and ambiguity. Whether a
community is immune from state taxation might remain unclear until a tribe or
tribal member litigates the matter or a tribe negotiates a tax agreement with the
state. 5 Third, uncertainty and ambiguity in the law might inure to the benefit
of states and to the detriment of tribes and tribal members. In other words, if the
status of a geographical area remains unclear, a state may continue to assert tax
jurisdiction over the area despite the fact that the community would qualify as a
dependent Indian community under a flexible analysis. Thus, the establishment
of a flexible test would place burdens and risks on tribes, including the
willingness to resist states by bearing the costs of litigation and facing the
possibility of an unfavorable, more restrictive definition as an outcome.
Nonetheless, regardless of the problems attendant to applying a flexible analysis,
a flexible analysis is preferable to the rigid Narragansettand Venetie "set aside"
requirements, which significantly limit the relevance of the dependent Indian
community concept.

271. ChickasawNation, 115 S. Ct. at 2221.
272. I. It should be noted that the legal incidence test does not always result in predictability. For instance,
a state tax statute may contain the following wording: "A tax is hereby imposed on the sale of a pack of
cigarettes." In this case, it is unclear whether the legal incidence falls upon the seller or the purchaser. Thus,
because the legal incidence is unclear, the legal incidence test does not lead to predictability in this scenario.
273. See United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971).
274. See iat
275. A clear way around uncertainty is for a tribe to submit an application to the Secretary of the Interior
to place the land in question in trust pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994)).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Narragansettand Venetie courts ruled that a dependent
Indian community cannot exist unless the federal government has "set aside" the
land in question, which requires: (1) federal ownership of the land, (2) federal
trust land, or (3) congressional action designating land for the use of Indian tribes.
Assuming the "set aside" requirement is valid, the dependent Indian community
concept may be of limited usefulness because it will largely parallel the
reservation concept. However, the validity of the Narragansettand Venetie "set
aside" requirement, as applied to the dependent Indian community concept, is
questionable. Assuming the "set aside" element is not essential to determining
whether a dependent Indian community exists, courts should consider an
alternative flexible analysis. A better analysis would assess: (1) the proper
community of reference; (2) whether an Indian community exists; and, assuming
an Indian community exists, (3) whether the entire relationship between the
federal government and the Indian community evidence federal intent to exert
jurisdiction over the distinctly Indian community.
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